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I. INTRODUCTION
In what has been referred to as the most far-reaching social leg-
islation since the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the federal Americans
with Disabilities Act ("ADA") unveiled a directive for the elimina-
tion of discrimination against individuals with disabilities.' Mod-
eled after legislation remedying discrimination toward racial and
ethnic minorities, the ADA covers the third largest minority in the
United States: disabled individuals. 2 To effectuate this remedy,
the ADA reveals a "paradigm shift" behind programs serving peo-
ple with disabilities.3 The ADA diverges from the paternalistic
mindset of preceding federal laws and programs and endeavors
1. David L. Ryan, Americans with Disabilities: The Legal Revolution, 60 J. KAN. BAR
ASS'N 13, 13 (Nov. 1991). In fact, the definitions and rules found within the ADA are
nearly identical to those used in the Civil Rights Act. Dawn V. Martin, Symposium: The
Americans with Disabilities Act-Introductory Comments, 8 J.L. & HEALTH 1, 6 (1994).
2. See supra note 1; see also Jack McNeil, Americans with Disabilities: 1997, Current
Population Reports, Series P70-73 (2001), available at www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/p70-
73.pdf and http://www.census.gov/population/www/pop-profile/files/1999/chapl6.pdf.
3. Robert L. Mullen, The Americans with Disabilities Act: an Introduction for Lawyers
and Judges, 29 LAND & WATER L. REV. 175, 177-78 (1994).
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instead to provide access to "opportunities, independence, self-
sufficiency, and prevention of injury."
4
Despite the ADA's noble goals, individuals seeking recourse un-
der the Act are at times left without remedy. The circuit courts of
appeals are markedly split over whether Congress intended Title I
to offer the sole means to address employment discrimination un-
der the ADA, or instead, for both Titles I and II to cover employ-
ment. 5 This has led to confusion: under which Title should an
individual bring a claim for employment discrimination? When
courts have concluded that an individual incorrectly brought a
claim under Title II, the individual loses valuable time,6 assuming
that the individual is not time barred at that juncture from bring-
ing a claim under Title 1.7 Accordingly, the resolution of this issue
is of great import.
II. BACKGROUND: THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT
The ADA addresses the three major areas in which disabled
persons face discrimination." "Title I concerns employment dis-
crimination with respect to non-federal employees."9 Title II deals
with services and practices of state and local governments. 10 Title
4. Id.; Martin, supra note 1, at 2.
5. See Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 360 n.1 (2001); see also Fleming v. State
Univ. of N.Y., 502 F. Supp. 2d 324, 330 (E.D.N.Y. 2007); Canfield v. Isaacs, 523 F. Supp. 2d
885, 886 (N.D. Ind. 2007).
6. See, e.g., Zimmerman v. Dep't of Justice, 170 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 1999) (upholding
dismissal of plaintiffs Title II claim); Ayantola v. Comm. Technical Cols. of Conn., No.
3:05CV957, 2007 WL 963178, at *2 (D. Conn. Mar. 30, 2007) (granting dismissal of plain-
tifFs Title II claim with prejudice); Syken v. N.Y. Exec. Dep't, No. 02 Civ. 4673, 2003 WL
1787250, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 2003) (same); Sworn v. W. N.Y. Children's Psychiatric
Ctr., 269 F. Supp. 2d 152, 157-58 (W.D.N.Y. 2003) (same); Canfield, 523 F. Supp. 2d at 886
(same).
7. Since the ADA fails to provide a statute of limitations and the general federal stat-
ute of limitations, 28 U.S.C. § 1658, does not apply, district courts are to apply the statute
of limitations governing state causes of action most closely analogous to the ADA claim.
See Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 660 (1987); most courts apply the two-year
statute of limitations applicable to personal injury actions. Everett v. Cobb County Sch.
Dist., 138 F.3d 1407, 1409 (11th Cir. 1998); but see Pickern v. Holiday Quality Foods, Inc.,
293 F.3d 1133, 1137 (9th Cir. 2002) (applying California's one year statute of limitations for
personal injury actions).
8. Ryan, supra note 1, at 13; see also Mullen, supra note 3, at 181.
9. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (1991); see also Mullen, supra note 3, at 181; Zimmerman v. Or.
Dep't of Justice, 170 F.3d 1169, 1172 (9th Cir. 1999) ("The term 'employer' does not include.
. the United States, a corporation wholly owned by the government of the United States,
or an Indian Tribe
) (quoting § 12111(5)(B)))
10. See § 12132; see also Mullen, supra note 3, at 181.
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III imposes requirements on businesses for public accommoda-
tions.1 This comment is concerned solely with Titles I and II.
The definitions of certain terms within the ADA vary depending
upon which Title of the Act is applicable. 12 The definition of dis-
ability, however, is steadfast throughout the entire Act. 13 Under
the ADA, a person with a disability is "one who has a physical or
mental impairment that substantially limits a major life activity,




Title I provides that "[n]o covered entity shall discriminate
against a qualified individual with a disability because of the dis-
ability of such individual in regard to job application procedures,
the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee
compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privi-
leges of employment."'15 This Title essentially requires an em-
ployer to make all employment decisions without regard to the
disabilities of any individual.16 To be covered under this Title, the
person must be "qualified" for the position in question.1 7 A "quali-
fied" individual is one who is able to perform the "essential func-
tions" of the job with or without "reasonable accommodations."'i8
11. See § 12182; see also Mullen, supra note 3, at 181.
12. Id. at 182.
13. Id.
14. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1991). This definition was taken from the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973 by all agencies charged with implementing the ADA. Mullen, supra note 3, at 182;
see 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-96 (1991). The Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act of
2008 (ADAAA), effective January 2009, amends the definition of "disability" in the ADA.
ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, §§ 1-7, 122 Stat. 3533, 3533-3559
(2009). The ADAAA retains the basic definition of "disability," but it reverses many United
States Supreme Court rulings interpreting this definition. Michael Newman, The Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Amendments Act of 2008, 55-DEc FED. LAW. 12, 12 (2008). Specifi-
cally, the ADAAA, inter alia, (1) "directs the EEOC to revise its regulations defining the
phrase 'substantially limits[;]"' (2) "expands the definition of 'major life activities[;]" (3)
"provides that individuals covered only under the 'regarded as' prong are not entitled to
reasonable accomondation[;]" and (4) "emphasizes that the definition of 'disability' should
be interpreted broadly." Notice Concerning the Americans with Disabilaities Act (ADA)
Amendments of 2008, http://www.eeoc.gov/ada/amendments-notice.html.
15. 42 U.S.C. § 12112. Covered entity means an "employer, employment agency, labor
organization, or joint labor management committee." § 12111. The prohibition under this
Act, however, extends only to those employers with 25 or more employees. § 12111.
16. Mullen, supra note 3, at 186.
17. Martin, supra note 1, at 5; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12111.
18. Martin, supra note 1, at 5; see also § 12111.
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Congress chose the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion ("EEOC") to implement and enforce Title I and authorized it
to prescribe any necessary rules and regulations. 19 Title I also
absorbed the remedies and procedures of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, as amended.20 Thus, Title I of the ADA in-
cludes the Civil Rights Act's charge requirement, which calls for
the claimant to exhaust all administrative remedies before filing a
cause of action in federal court.
21
B. Title H
Title II provides that "no qualified individual with a disability
shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation
in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities
of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such
entity. '22 A "public entity" under this Title includes: (1) "state
and local governments[;]" (2) "any agency or instrumentality
thereof[;]" and (3) "The National Railroad Passenger
Corp [oration]."23
Similar to Title I, Congress assigned the administration of Title
II to governmental agencies. 24 For Title II, however, the legisla-
ture charged the Transportation Barriers Compliance Board, the
Department of Justice ("DOJ"), and the Department of Transpor-
tation with the promulgation and enforcement of the standards
under this Title. 25 Also, unlike Title I, the enforcement procedures
of Title II are identical to the procedures found in section 505 of
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.26
The enforcement procedures of the Rehabilitation Act do not re-
quire non-federal employees to exhaust available administrative
remedies. 27 An individual making a claim under Title II, there-




20. Martin, supra note 1, at 6
21. Zimmerman v. Or. Dep't of Justice, 170 F.3d 1169, 1178 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing
Smith v. Barton, 914 F.2d 1330, 1338 (9th Cir. 1990)).
22. 42 U.S.C. § 12132.
23. Ryan, supra note 1, at 17.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.; see also William Christian, Normalization as a Goal: the Americans with Dis-
abilities Act and Individuals with Mental Retardation, 73 TEX. L. REV. 409, 433 (1994).
27. Ryan, supra note 1, at 16.
28. Ethridge v. Alabama, 847 F. Supp. 903, 907 (M.D. Ala. 1993); "Most courts that
have considered the issue have generally concluded that Title II does not have an exhaus-
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III. THE DISAGREEMENT: DOES TITLE II COVER EMPLOYMENT?
Despite the seemingly distinct objectives of Titles I and II, a
marked split exists between the courts over whether the scopes of
the two Titles are mutually exclusive. Specifically, contrary au-
thority exists throughout the United States as to whether Title II
of the ADA applies to employment discrimination. In University
of Alabama v. Garrett,29 the United States Supreme Court, with-
out resolving the question, acknowledged the split among the cir-
cuits over "whether Title II . . .is available for claims of employ-
ment discrimination when Title I of the ADA expressly deals with
that subject."30  The Second Circuit has similarly acknowledged
the inconsistent treatment of Title 11.31
As previously mentioned, the ADA covers a large portion of the
United States' population. Accordingly, it would behoove the
Court to resolve this issue. This author believes that the inclusion
of the word "employment" in Title I and exclusion of the word from
Title II, along with the structure of the ADA, indicate the congres-
sional intent to combat employment discrimination through Title I
alone. If the question is presented to the Court, it should deter-
mine that Title II does not cover claims of employment discrimina-
tion.32
A. Courts Interpreting Title 11 to Cover Employment
Some courts have explicitly stated that Title II applies to public
employment discrimination,3 3 while other courts have done so im-
tion requirement." Canfield, 523 F. Supp. 2d at 888 (N.D. Ind. 2007) (citing Bogovich v.
Sandoval, 189 F.3d 999, 1002 (9th Cir. 1999)); Davoll v. Webb, 194 F.3d 116, 1124 (10th
Cir. 1999); Staats v. County of Sawyer, 220 F.3d 511, 518 (7th Cir. 2000)).
29. 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
30. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 360 n.1.
31. See Perry v. State Ins. Fund, 83 Fed. App'x. 351, 354 n.1 (2d Cir. 2003) ('There
remain questions regarding ... whether Title II ADA violations can be based on employ-
ment discrimination .. "); Mullen v. Rieckhoff, 189 F.3d 461, 461 (2d Cir. 1999) ("Plaintiff
rightfully points to a split of authority over whether an employment discrimination plaintiff
may avoid the ADA's requirement of an EEOC charge by filing under Title II of that Act.").
32. The Court insinuated in Garrett that it would interpret Title II to not include
claims for employment. Fleming, 502 F. Supp. 2d at 334 ("As the Supreme Court pointed
out. . . '[wihere Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits
it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intention-
ally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion."') (quoting Garrett, 531 U.S. at
360 n.1)).
33. See, e.g., Holbrook v. Alpharetta, 112 F.3d 1522, 1528-29 (11th Cir. 1997) (finding
that the DOJ's regulations permit a narcotic detective's Title II claim against his employer,
the City of Alpharetta Police Department, after his duties were adjusted due to his failing
eyesight); see also McNely v. Ocala Star-Banner Corp., 99 F.3d 1068, 1073 (11th Cir. 1996)
Winter 2009
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plicitly. For example, in Holmes v. Texas A&M University,34 the
court dismissed an employment discrimination claim filed under
Title II because the statute of limitations had run, thereby, implic-
itly indicating that such a claim is possible if it is timely filed.
35
Likewise, Doe v. University of Maryland Medical System Corp.
36
seems to permit an employment discrimination claim under Title
II. In University of Maryland, the court upheld the dismissal of
the plaintiffs Title II claim against his employer because he was
not an "otherwise qualified" individual with a disability, not be-
cause Title II does not support such a claim.37 While the plaintiffs
in Holmes and University of Maryland were ultimately unable to
recover under Title II, the courts in neither case dismissed the
claims because Title II did not support the claimants' causes of
action.38
The court in Bledsoe v. Palm Beach County Soil & Water Con-
servation District39 offered a detailed analysis of why Title II ap-
plies to employment. The claimant in Bledsoe filed an employ-
ment discrimination claim under Title I of the ADA and the Reha-
(stating in dicta that 'Title II of the ADA ... applies to public sector employment ...."),
cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1228 (1997); Davol v. Webb, 194 F.3d 1116, 1130 (10th Cir. 1999)
("[W]e expressly decline to decide whether Title II covers employment discrimination. In-
stead, we assume that it does and turn to the issues properly on appeal."); Hernandez v.
Hartford, 959 F. Supp. 125 (D. Conn. 1997) (holding that the regulations promulgated by
the DOJ sustain a City administrative assistant's claim for employment discrimination
under Title II when the city allegedly denied her request to work at home while she suf-
fered from preterm labor) (citing Petersen v. Univ. of Wisc. Bd. of Regents, 818 F. Supp.
1276, 1279 (W.D. Wis. 1993))).
34. 145 F.3d 681 (5th Cir. 1998).
35. See Holmes, 145 F.3d at 683-86. In Holmes, Dr. Ronald E. Holmes suffered a severe
stroke and developed aphasia ("a loss of the ability to process language") while he was a
tenured professor at Texas A&M University. Id. at 682-83. Three years later, the Univer-
sity terminated him and revoked his tenure for "professional incompetence." Id. at 683.
After his termination was affirmed by the Texas A&M Board of Regents, Holmes filed suit
against the University, alleging that his termination was based upon his disability in viola-
tion of Title II of the ADA. Id.
36. 50 F.3d 1261 (4th Cir. 1995).
37. See Univ. of Md. Med. Sys., Corp., 50 F.3d at 1264-67. In this case, Dr. Doe was a
neurosurgical resident who contracted HIV while working at University of Maryland Medi-
cal System, Corp. (UMMSC). Id. at 1262-63. Subsequently, UMMSC permanently sus-
pended Dr. Doe from surgery and offered him alternative residencies in non-surgical fields.
Id. UMMSC then fired Dr. Doe from the residency program after he refused the alternative
residencies. Id. at 1262-63. Dr. Doe brought suit against the UMMSC under Title II of the
ADA and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Id. at 1263. The court held that Dr. Doe's
condition posed "a significant risk to the health or safety of their patients that cannot be
eliminated by reasonable accommodation, and therefore [he is] not otherwise qualified
within the meaning of... the ADA." Id. at 1267.
38. See Holmes, 145 F.3d at 683-86; Univ. ofMd. Med. Sys., Corp., 50 F.3d at 1264-67.
39. 133 F.3d 816, 820-25 (11th Cir. 1998).
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bilitation Act.40 Bledsoe's employer, however, did not have the
requisite number of employees to qualify as an "employer" as de-
fined in Title I, and thereby, was not a "covered entity" to which
that Title applied. 41 The claimant subsequently amended his com-
plaint to bring his claim under Title II instead.
42
The lower court dismissed his claim, determining that Title II
did not support his claim.43 The claimant appealed this decision,
and the Eleventh Circuit addressed, inter alia, the issue of
whether Title II of the ADA applies to discrimination in employ-
ment.44 In its analysis, the court relied upon the language of Title
II, the DOJ's regulations, and precedent.
45
The court concluded that Title II applies to employment dis-
crimination. 46 The majority emphasized that Congress intended
Title II to mimic section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.47 The court
reasoned that because the focus of section 504 was to "promote
and expand employment opportunities in the public and private
sectors for handicapped individuals and to place such individuals
in employment," Title II was intended to reach employment dis-
crimination.
48
The court also disagreed with the lower court's limited reading
of Title II's language. 49 The majority interpreted the final clause
of Title II's discrimination provision as a catch-all provision that
prohibits all discrimination by a public entity in all contexts.50
The court buttressed this analysis with the DOJ regulations per-
40. Bledsoe, 133 F.3d at 818. The claimant, Mark Bledsoe, was employed by the Con-
servation District to perform land surveys and perform manual labor. Id. Bledsoe re-
quested that the District alter his responsibilities after he sustained a knee injury while




43. Id. at 819.
44. Id.
45. Bledsoe, 133 F.3d at 820-25.
46. Id. at 821 (stating that the legislative commentary to that effect "is so pervasive as
to belie any contention that Title II does not apply to employment actions.").
47. Id.
48. Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 701(8) (1998)).
49. Id.
50. Bledsoe, 133 F.3d at 821-22. Title II provides that "no qualified individual with a
disability shall, by reasons of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied
the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to
discrimination by any such entity." 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (emphasis added). The Second Cir-
cuit has also found a catch-all provision but in a different clause. See Innovative Health
Systems, Inc. v. White Plains, 117 F.3d 37, 45 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that "programs, ser-




taining to this Title. 51 As previously mentioned, the ADA author-
izes the DOJ to write the regulations implementing Title 11.52
Pursuant to this authority, the Attorney General added to the
Code of Federal Regulations the following provision:
(b)(2) For the purposes of this part, the requirements of sec-
tion 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as established by
the regulations of the Department of Justice in 28 CFR part
41, as those requirements pertain to employment, apply to
employment in any service, program, or activity conducted by
a public entity if that public entity is not also subject to the
jurisdiction of Title 1.
53
The court went on to avow that, pursuant to the Chevron princi-
ple, 54 it could not ignore the DOJ's reasonable construction of
statutory language: Title II applies to employment. 55
The court also cited cases offering precedential support for the
conclusion that Title II covers employment discrimination
claims.56 The court discussed Wagner v. Texas A&M University,57
which acknowledged the incongruity with permitting employment
discrimination claims under Titles I and II but requiring the ex-
haustion of administrative remedies only with a Title I claim.58
The court in Wagner noted that this inconsistency is undesirable;
however, it refused to deviate from the DOJ's regulations and give
the ADA a meaning that it did not feel was entirely evident. 59
51. Bledsoe, 133 F.3d at 822.
52. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
53. Bledsoe, 133 F.3d at 822 (citing 28 C.F.R. § 25.140 (1997)).
54. The Chevron principle is that "considerable weight should be accorded to an execu-
tive department's construction of a statutory scheme, unless the regulations are arbitrary,
capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute." Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res.
Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).
55. Bledsoe, 133 F.3d at 822-23.
56. Id. at 823.
57. 939 F. Supp. 1297 (S.D. Tex. 1996).
58. Bledsoe, 133 F.3d at 824 (citing Wagner, 939 F. Supp. at 1310). In Wagner, the
claimant, Dr. Jackson Wagner, brought a Title II claim against his employer, alleging that
because he suffered from depression and post-traumatic stress disorder, the University: (1)
"failed to reassign him to teach the courses he traditionally taught," (2) "jobs and benefits
were denied to his acquaintances," and (3) "he was subjected to public ridicule." Wagner,
939 F. Supp. at 1308.
59. Wagner, 939 F. Supp. at 1310; accord Silk v. Chicago, No. 95 C0143, 1996 WL
312074 (N.D. Ill. Jun. 7, 1996) (noting that while the administrative procedures of Titles I
and Title II are different, the regulations "adopted by the [DOJ] establish that Title II's




Justice Hill wrote a concurring opinion in Bledsoe.60 Hill stated
that the precedent weighed too heavily in favor of Title II support-
ing an employment discrimination claim to hold otherwise; yet, he
expressed reluctance in doing so. 61 He found the actual reasoning
behind the interpretation to be troublesome and sounding in judi-
cial activism.62 Hill is not alone in feeling restrained by precedent
despite reasoning to the contrary.
In Clifton v. Georgia Merit System, 63 the District Court for the
Northern District of Georgia held that Title II of the ADA sus-
tained an individual's claim against a public employer for em-
ployment discrimination.64 The majority, however, spent the
greater part of its analysis writing how all reason supported an
outcome to the contrary.
65
The court noted first that interpreting Title II to cover employ-
ment discrimination would render Title I redundant, thereby dis-
obeying a cardinal canon of statutory interpretation: courts
should not interpret statutes so as to leave superfluous other pro-
visions of the same statute.66 Justice Pannell, writing for the ma-
jority, acknowledged that such an interpretation did not render
Title I wholly redundant; yet, it did to the extent that an individ-
ual who works for or applies for a position with a public employer
can bring a discrimination claim under either Title.
67
The court also emphasized another statutory interpretation
principle: "where language is used in one part of a statute but
omitted in another, it is presumed that such omission is inten-
tional."68 The court observed that Title I includes the word "em-
ployment," while Title II is titled "Public Services" and excludes
any reference to "employee," "employer," or "employment. '"69 Addi-
tionally, the court pointed to Title I's limitation to certain sized
60. Bledsoe, 133 F.3d at 825 (Hill, J., concurring).
61. Id.
62. Id. ("With a tip of the hat to the district judge, I reluctantly conclude that the flow
of precedent is too strong for him or for us to swim upstream.").
63. 478 F. Supp. 2d 1356 (N.D. Ga. 2007).
64. Clifton, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 1366. Wagan Clifton, Jr. filed a claim under Title II
against Georgia Merit System (GMS), alleging that that GMS failed to provide reasonable
accommodations for his blindness during a certification exam. Id. at 1360.
65. See Id. at 1363-66.
66. Id. at 1365. (citing Clark v. Chicago, No. 97-C-4820, 2000 WL 875422, at *5-6 (N.D.
Ill. Jun. 28, 2000) and Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 522, 562 (1990)).
67. Clifton, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 1365.
68. Id. at 1365 (citing Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 11 (1962) ("We believe it
fundamental that a section of a statute should not be read in isolation from the context of




"employers" and prohibition of punitive damages against munici-
pal employers. 70 The lack of such limitations in Title II reinforces
the supposition that Title I was meant to singularly address em-
ployment discrimination. 71 Pannell asserted that a finding to the
contrary would nullify much of Title 1.72
The majority also found it of great concern that permitting an
individual to bring an employment claim under Title II would offer
a loophole to avoid "the administrative exhaustion requirements of
Title I.'73 This loophole would cause problems in practice because
it forfeits the administrative agency's opportunity to investigate,
mediate, and take remedial action, as well as the employer's abil-
ity to settle through conference and conciliation. 74 Despite these
points, the court felt bound by precedent, specifically Bledsoe, and
therefore permitted the plaintiffs claim under Title II for em-
ployment discrimination.
75
B. Courts Interpreting Title II to Not Cover Employment
Other courts have raised the same concerns found in Clifton but
did not feel restrained by Bledsoe. The Ninth Circuit was the first
court to fully address this question and find that Title II does not
extend to employment discrimination claims. 76 In Zimmerman v.
Department of Justice,77 the court arrived at this conclusion after
analyzing the language and the structure of the ADA and refuting
arguments to the contrary.
78
The court in Zimmerman observed that the ADA consists of five
titles, and only Title I refers to employment in any capacity.79 The
majority then addressed the Chevron principle.80 The court ex-
plained that the Chevron principle engages a two-part inquiry: (1)
"apply the 'traditional rules of statutory construction' to determine
whether Congress has expressed its intent unambiguously[;]" and
70. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981(b)(1), (3) (1991)).
71. Id.
72. Clifton, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 1365-66.
73. Id. at 1365-66.
74. Id. at 1366 (citing Shah v. Dep't of Civil Serv., 168 F.3d 610, 614 (2d Cir. 1999)); see
also Patterson v. Dep't of Corr., 35 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1109-10 (C.D. Ill. 1999)).
75. Clifton, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 1366.
76. See Zimmerman v. Dep't of Justice, 170 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 1999).
77. 170 F.3d 1169.
78. See Zimmerman, 170 F.3d 1169. The plaintiff in Zimmerman was visually im-
paired. Id. at 1171. He filed a claim under Titles I and II against his employer, claiming
that his employer failed to accommodate his disability. Id.
79. Id. at 1172. Albeit, Title I is limited to non-federal employment. Id.
80. Id. at 1173.
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(2) if "Congress left a gap for an administrative agency to fill[,]"
the court "must uphold the administrative regulation unless it is
'arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute."','
Justice Graber, writing for the majority, asserted that the Chev-
ron analysis ended at the first step; Congress has "unambiguously
expressed its intent for Title II not to apply to employment."8 2 The
court arrived at this conclusion after examining the language of
section 12132 in Title II and the ADA's organization as a whole.
8 3
The majority acknowledged that the ADA did not define the
phrase "services, programs, and activities" found in the definition
of a "qualified individual with a disability" in terms of Title II, and
therefore those terms must be interpreted by employing their "or-
dinary, contemporary, and common meanings. '8 4 The court rea-
soned that the phrase "services, programs, and activities[,]" aligns
more closely with "outputs of a governmental agency, and not in-
puts, such as employment."8 5 Moreover, the court considered it to
be a stretch to consider employment a "service, program, or activ-
ity" of a public entity.
8 6
The court also addressed whether the second clause of section
12132 constituted a catch-all provision.87 In addition to the court
finding that interpreting the second clause as a catch-all provision
conflicted with Ninth Circuit precedent, Graber also reasoned that
interpreting the second clause as such took it out of context.
88
The court pointed out that the clause was plainly under Title
II's heading of "Public Services" and that inclusion of the second
clause in a single sentence in section 12132 intimated that the
second clause pertains to "services, programs, or activities."
8 9
Graber recognized that this reasoning alone would not place this
81. Id. at 1173 (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44).
82. Id.
83. Zimmerman, 170 F.3d at 1173-74. Section 12132 provides: "[N]o qualified individ-
ual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or
be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subject
to discrimination by any such entity." 42 U.S.C. § 12132.
84. Id. at 1174 (citing U.S. v. Iverson, 162 F.3d 1015, 1022 (9th Cir. 1998)).
85. Id. (quoting § 12131(2))
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1175. See, e.g., Bledsoe, 133 F.3d at 822; Innovative Health Sys., 117 F.3d at
44-45; Alberti v. Sheriffs Dep't, 32 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1169 (N.D. Cal. 1998); Downs v. Mass.
Bay Transp. Auth., 13 F. Supp. 2d 130, 135 (D. Mass. 1998). The first clause of section
12132 is "no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be
excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activi-
ties of a public entity .... See § 12132. Whereas, the second clause of section 12132 is: "or
be subject to discrimination by any such entity." See § 12132 (emphasis added).
88. Zimmerman, 170 F.3d at 1175.
89. Id. at 1175.
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interpretation beyond contention; therefore, he supported his ar-
gument by noting that regardless of whether section 12132 is bro-
ken up into separate clauses, a claimant under Title II must still
be a "qualified individual with a disability" within the meaning of
that Title.90 A "qualified individual" under Title II is
an individual who, with or without reasonable modifications
to rules, policies, or practices, the removal of architectural,
communication, or transportation barriers, or the provision of
auxiliary aids and services, meets the essential eligibility re-
quirements for the receipt of services or the participation in
programs or activities provided by a public entity.91
Accordingly, the court concluded that the second clause must re-
late to a "service, program, or activity" offered by a public entity
because otherwise an individual would not be "qualified" within
the meaning of Title 11.92 The court also stated that the placement
of the disjunction "or" between the two clauses simply demon-
strates the congressional intent to prohibit intentional discrimina-
tion as well as disparate treatment. 93
The majority then analyzed the structure of the ADA.94 Graber
asserted that the structure is demonstrative of the congressional
intent for Title I to offer the singular relief for employment dis-
crimination.95 The court stated that (1) employment-specific pro-
visions are included only in Title I, whereas any reference to em-
ployment is absent from Title II; (2) a "qualified individual with a
disability" in Title I is defined as one who can work, while the
same is defined in Title II as one who is "eligible to receive ser-
vices or participate in programs[;]" (3) Title I has procedural re-
quirements that would be eviscerated if Title II covered employ-
ment claims; (4) Congress selected different regulatory authorities
for each Title; and (5) Title I, and not Title II, is linked to the em-
ployment provisions of the Rehabilitation Act.96
The majority specifically addressed the contention that Title II
incorporates the employment provisions of the Rehabilitation
Act.97 The court acknowledged that Congress modeled Title II af-
90. Id.
91. 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2) (emphasis added).
92. Zimmerman, 170 F.3d at 1175-76.
93. Id. at 1176 (citing Crowder v. Kitagawa, 81 F.3d 1480, 1483-84 (9th Cir. 1996)).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 1177-82.
97. Zimmerman, 170 F.3d at 1179.
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ter the Rehabilitation Act but stated that Title II is different in
very important respects. 98 Title II applies to public entities only,
unlike the Rehabilitation Act, which applies to public entities and
private entities that receive public assistance.99 Graber inter-
preted this distinction to mean that Congress desired to limit the
reach of Title II.100 Moreover, while Title II borrows language
from the Rehabilitation Act, Congress did not import any of the
language referring to employment. 10 1 Also, unlike the Rehabilita-
tion Act, the ADA has a Title specifically dealing with employ-
ment: Title 1.102 For these reasons, the court found no support for
the contention that an employment discrimination claim can be
brought under Title 11.103
More recently, the District Court of the Eastern District of New
York addressed this issue in Fleming v. State University of New
York. 10 4 In Fleming, the plaintiff brought a claim for employment
discrimination under both Titles I and 11.105 The majority noted
that the Second Circuit had failed to approach this question con-
sistently.10 6 In resolving the question within the Second Circuit,
the court found the reasoning in Zimmerman especially persua-
sive. 10 7 The majority followed the analysis in Zimmerman and
determined that the language of the ADA is clear and unambigu-
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1180.
100. Id. at 1180-81.
101. Id. at 1181-82
102. Zimmerman, 170 F.3d at 1181-82.
103. Id.
104. 502 F. Supp. 2d 324 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).
105. Fleming, 502 F. Supp. 2d at 326-28. Dr. Lester Fleming brought a Title II claim
against his employer, State University of New York. Id. at 326. Fleming alleged that the
State University improperly disclosed the fact that he has sickle cell anemia to a prospec-
tive employer, effectively losing his offer for employment. Id. at 326-37.
106. Fleming, 502 F. Supp. 2d at 330; compare Olson v. State, 04-CV-0419, 2005 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 44929, at *13 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 2005) (holding that Title II covers employment
discrimination); Transp. Workers Union, 342 F. Supp. 2d 160, 160 (same); Bloom v. Bd. of
Educ., 00 Civ. 2728, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5290, at *33 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31 2003) (same);
Winokur v. Office of Court Admin., 190 F. Supp. 2d 444, 449 (same); Magee v. Nassau
County Med. Ctr., 27 F. Supp. 2d 154, 159 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (same); with Ayantola v. Comm.
Technical Colls. of Conn., No. 3:05CV957, 2007 WL 963178, at *2 (D. Conn. Mar. 30, 2007)
(holding that Title II does not cover employment discrimination); Cormier v. Meriden, No.
3:03CV1819, 2004 WL 2377079, at *8 (D. Conn. Sept. 30 2004) (same); Filush v. Weston,
266 F. Supp. 2d 322, 327 (D. Conn. 2003) (same); Syken v. N.Y. Exec. Dep't, No. 02 Civ.
4673, 2003 WL 1787250, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 2003) (same); Sworn v. W. N.Y. Children's
Psychiatric Ctr., 269 F. Supp. 2d 152, 157-58 (W.D.N.Y. 2003).
107. Fleming, 502 F. Supp. 2d at 330-334.
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ous.1'8 Accordingly, the court held that Title II did not apply to
claims of employment discrimination. 109
One month later in Canfield v. Isaacs,110 the District Court of
the Northern District of Indiana also held that Title II does not
cover employment claims. The court considered the inclusion of
employment language in Title I and the absence of that language
in Title II evidence of the congressional intent to have Title I serve
as the sole remedy for employment discrimination under the
ADA."' Quoting Zimmerman, the majority also found that the
second clause of section 12132 could not serve as a "general" or
catch-all provision because of Title II's discrete definition of a
"qualified" individual. 12 Additionally, the court noted the unde-
sirability of the redundancy created by interpreting Title II to
cover employment." 3 Finally, the court raised the novel point con-
cerning the absence of a provision requiring coordination between
the agencies charged with enforcing Titles I and II.114 The major-
ity noted that Congress feared conflicts between the EEOC's en-
forcement of Title I and the DOJ's enforcement of the Rehabilita-
tion Act, and therefore, included a provision requiring the coordi-
nation between the two. 1 5 The court considered the absence of an
analogous coordination provision between the EEOC and the DOJ
with respect to Titles I and II as additional evidence of the con-
gressional intent to regulate employment discrimination under
Title I alone."1
6
The District Court of the Western District of Pennsylvania pro-
vided a similar reasoning when addressing this issue recently in
108. Id. at 333-334.
109. Id. at 334.
110. 523 F. Supp. 2d 885, 886 (N.D. Ind. 2007). Rick Canfield, a deputy sheriff, sus-
tained various work-related injuries and brought a claim under Title II against the sheriff,
the county, and its board of commissioners alleging, inter alia, a failure to reasonably ac-
commodate his disabilities. Canfield, 523 F. Supp. 2d at 886. His claim was dismissed
because the court found that Title II did not support his cause of action. Id.
111. Canfield, 52 F. Supp. 2d at 891.
112. Id. (quoting Zimmerman, 170 F.3d at 1176).
113. Id. "[Ilt violates the interpretive canon presuming that no statutory provision is
mere surplusage." Id. (quoting Commodity Trend Servi., Inc. v. Commodity Futures Trad-
ing Comm'n, 223 F.3d 981, 989 (7th Cir. 2000)).
114. Id.
115. Id. (citing § 12117(b)). 'The agencies with enforcement authority for actions which
allege employment discrimination under this subchapter and under the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973 shall develop procedures to ensure that administrative complaints filed under this
subchapter and under the Rehabilitation Act ... are dealt with in a manner that avoids
duplication of effort and prevents imposition of inconsistent or conflicting standards. . .." §
12117(b).
116. Canfield, 523 F. Supp. 2d at 891.
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Hemby-Grubb v. Indiana University of Pennsylvania.17 The court
found Zimmerman particularly persuasive and concluded that
Congress did not intend for Title II to cover employment discrimi-
nation after considering the "the structure of the ADA[ ] and the
ordinary meanings of the words 'services,' 'programs,' and 'activi-
ties' ....118 The majority also echoed the Chevron analysis of the
Zimmerman court, finding that reliance on the regulations pro-
vided by the DOJ was unjustified.11 9 Consequently, the court held




Both sides of this argument offer noteworthy points supported
by plentiful precedent, seemingly with Bledsoe and Zimmerman
operating as the polarizing cases. The courts finding that Title II
applies to employment, however, fall short in their ability to refute
the opposing viewpoint's contentions. Zimmerman and its prog-
eny acknowledge the arguments made by the opposing courts, and
those opinions set forth why the opposing viewpoint is incorrect.
True persuasiveness exists when a court's examination can pro-
claim not only why its particular viewpoint is correct but also
point to where the opposing viewpoint falters.
As previously stated, while the ADA authorized the DOJ to en-
act regulations pertaining to Title II, the Chevron principle does
not obligate the courts to dogmatically follow every regulation the
DOJ creates. 121 Indeed, the court must first determine whether
the statutory text is ambiguous as to the congressional intent.
122
The courts relying upon the DOJ's regulations to find that Title II
applies to employment read section 12132 alone and fail to ana-
117. 2:06cv1307, 2008 WL 4372937, at *6-7 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 22, 2008). Dr. Hemby-Grubb
brought suit against her employer, Indiana University of Pennsylvania, claiming, inter
alia, that under Title II her employer should have provided reasonable accommodations.
Hebby-Grubb, 2008 WL 4372937, at *5. The court dismissed Hemby-Grubb's claim because
Title II did not support it. Id.
118. Hebby-Grubb, 2008 WL 4372937, at *6-7.
119. Id. at *7. "[A]gency regulations such as these are only entitled to deference when
Congress has not spoken directly to the precise question at issue and the agency's regula-
tion is based upon a reasonable interpretation of the statute. In Zimmerman, the court
held 'Congress unambiguously expressed its intent for Title II not to apply to employment.
Adopting this reasoning effectively ends the inquiry."' Id. (citations omitted).
120. Id.
121. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 467 U.S. at 844.
122. Id. at 844.
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lyze the whole statutory text in its context. 123 This reliance dem-
onstrates not only a deficiency in the analysis of the statute but
also a frustration of the Chevron principle, thereby severely injur-
ing the credibility and persuasiveness of those courts' opinions.
These concerns are echoed when the courts interpret any clause
of Title II to be a catch-all provision. 124 It should not go unnoticed
that the courts reading the whole statutory text arrive at the con-
trary conclusion; none of the courts that analyze the entire ADA
and each clause's context determine that Title II includes a catch-
all provision.
125
Additionally, while it is indisputable that the ADA was modeled
after aspects of the Rehabilitation Act, the courts finding that Ti-
tle II covers employment also fail to explore the differences be-
tween the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. 126 As discussed in
Zimmerman, these differences suggest that Title II was not in-
tended to include the aspects of the Rehabilitation Act that deal
with employment. 127 The Rehabilitation Act addresses many
forms of discrimination, and Title II, while lifting some of the Act's
language, did not import any language that deals with employ-
ment.128 Indeed, unlike the Rehabilitation Act, the ADA has a
Title specifically dealing with employment discrimination.
129
It is worth noting that restricting employment claims to Title I
does not impair the rights of disabled individuals or frustrate the
object of the ADA. Title I generally requires employers to make
employment decisions without regard to an individual's disability
and offers a means to remedy an instance in which this require-
123. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Hartford, 959 F. Supp. 125, 133 (D. Conn. 1997) ("On its
face, Title II prohibits discrimination in 'public services.' A plain reading of the section
does not reveal whether Title II covers employment discrimination addressed more specifi-
cally in Title I. The regulations under and the legislative history of ADA Title II make it
clear, however, that § 12132 prohibits employment discrimination by public entities on the
basis of disability.") (citations omitted)); Wagner, 939 F. Supp. at 1309 ("Although it is not
apparent from the plain language of § 12132, the regulations issued by the [DOJI make it
clear that the prohibition against discrimination by public entities includes employment
discrimination."); see also Winfrey v. Chicago, 957 F. Supp. 1014, 1023 n.7 (N.D. Ill. 1997)
(similar); Silk, 1996 WL 312074, at *10 (similar); Benedum v. Franklin Twp. Recycling
Cntr., No. 95-1343, 1996 WL 679402, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 12, 1996) (similar); Petersen v.
Univ. of Wis. Bd. of Regents, 818 F. Supp. 1276, 1278 (W.D. Wis. 1993) (similar).
124. See, e.g., Bledsoe, 133 F.3d at 822; Innovative Health Sys., 117 F.3d at 44-45; Al-
berti, 32 F. Supp. 2d at 1169; Downs, 13 F. Supp at 135.
125. See Zimmerman, 170 F.3d at 1175-76.
126. See, e.g., Bledsoe, 133 F.3d at 821; Alberti, 32 F. Supp 2d at 1169-70; Downs, 13 F.
Supp. 2d at 135; Ethridge, 847 F. Supp at 906.
127. See Zimmerman, 170 F.3d at 1180-82.
128. See id. at 1181-82.
129. See id. at 1181-82.
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ment is violated. Permitting employment claims under Title I,
however, would frustrate the provisions and procedures set forth
in Title I.
V. CONCLUSION
Undoubtedly, the question of whether Title II covers employ-
ment should be submitted to the United States Supreme Court.
This issue affects the third largest minority in the United States
and lies in a realm that is central to the independence of disabled
individuals: employment. Moreover, the courts' disunited ap-
proach to this issue leaves lawyers guessing under which Title to
file a claim, often delaying or denying a remedy to disabled indi-
viduals, thereby injuring the very purpose of the ADA. When con-
sidering the superior persuasiveness of the courts which have
found that Title II does not cover employment, if the Supreme
Court does choose to address this question, not only is the Court
likely to answer in the negative, this answer is the correct conclu-
sion.
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